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VIOLENCE’S LAW: ISRAEL’S CAMPAIGN
TO TRANSFORM INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL NORMS
GEORGE E. BISHARAT
Commonly law is seen as an alternative to violence, although it
relies on violence or its threat for enforcement. Through a study of
Israel’s campaign to transform international humanitarian law
(IHL) by systematically violating it, this essay considers the possibil-
ity that violence precedes and even creates law. Israel has a long
history of ad hoc ‘‘legal entrepreneurialism,’’ but its current effort,
launched during the second intifada, is institutionalized, persistent,
and internally coherent. The essay reviews the specific legal inno-
vations Israel has sought to establish, all of which expand the scope
of ‘‘legitimate’’ violence and its targets, contrary to IHL’s fundamen-
tal purposes of limiting violence and protecting non-combatants
from it.
WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP between law and violence? Students of the role
of law in society have pondered this question for decades. Prominent Yale
legal scholar Robert Cover began a widely-read law review article a number
of years ago with the striking introduction: ‘‘Legal interpretation takes
place in a field of pain and death. . . . Legal interpretive acts signal and
occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life.’’ The article, entitled ‘‘Violence and the
Word,’’ spurred renewed inquiry into the relationship between law, lan-
guage, and violence, and underscored law’s ultimate, though not always
visible, reliance on force.1 A later volume, inspired by Cover, was entitled
‘‘Law’s Violence,’’ and expanded on this theme, considering the question
of how violence done by and in the name of the law differs from illegal or
extralegal violence—or, indeed, if they differ at all.2
The relationship between law and violence has also figured prominently
in anthropological definitions of law. According to E. Adamson Hoebel, an
early and influential legal anthropologist, law was defined by the threat or
GEORGE E. BISHARAT is a professor at UC Hastings College of the Law. The author
would like to thank Rose Mishaan for her highly capable research assistance.
Thanks are also due to Laura Nader, Mai Taha, and the Interdisciplinary Group at
the University of Toronto, Susan Slyomovics, Vida Samiain, and audiences at the
University of California, Los Angeles and Cal-Poly Pomona for their insightful com-
ments on versions of this manuscript.
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XLII, No. 3, (Spring 2013), pp. 68–84, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614.
© 2013 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions
website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2013.XLII.3.68
actual application of violence: ‘‘A social norm is legal if its neglect or infrac-
tion is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical
force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege
of so acting.’’3 Violence, in other words, or the implicit threat of it, was
intrinsic to the very existence of law, and helped mark off the legal domain
from other normative spheres of social existence.4
What these conceptions of law seem to share is a sense that law pre-
cedes violence, and that violence is only the ultimate or end point of law.
For Cover, the judge interprets the law, and the subject of that legal act
then suffers the violent consequence, while for Hoebel the social norm
exists and then is enforced, if necessary, by the individual or social group
charged with the capacity to apply physical force. There is no real sense in
either case of a role for violence in the generation of law, or in other
words, of the possibility of violence’s legislative capacities.
This article, in contrast, emphasizes a different relationship between law
and violence, in which violence not only is law’s ultimate or end point, but
also its beginning. This relationship is examined in the context of Israel’s
attempted transformations of international humanitarian law (IHL; the
branch of public international law that governs the behavior of parties at
war), beginning with the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in
2000, and including its attacks on Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008–9
and 2012. While much of the international community viewed Israel’s
actions in each of these circumstances as essentially lawless, in fact, Israeli
military lawyers and policy makers very actively participated in helping to
define and identify targets and to craft legal doctrines to justify the actions
of Israeli soldiers. Hence, these outbursts of violence have involved signif-
icant illegality, while, paradoxically, remaining intensively legal at the same
time.5
The fundamental purposes of IHL as articulated by the International
Committee of the Red Cross are to ‘‘protect people who are not or are no
longer taking part in the hostilities, and to restrict the methods and means
of warfare employed.’’6 Israel’s actions thus threaten to turn international
humanitarian law on its head, allowing law to extend the scope of violence
and suffering to previously protected areas and persons.7 One must hasten
to add, however, that Israel is by no means alone in the quest to weapo-
nize law. Rather, it is one of a number of nations that pushes, and at times
exceeds, the boundaries of international law to enable its military greater
freedom and efficacy in combating its enemies—a point to which we shall
return later.8
While the principal focus of this article is on Israel’s post-2000 campaign
to transform international law, this period was not the first in which Israel
employed illegal force in seemingly novel ways. We will briefly survey
some of these previous examples to highlight both their similarities and
differences from Israel’s more contemporary effort to legislate through
violence.
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ISRAEL’S HISTORY OF LEGAL ENTREPRENEURIALISM
Israel is very much of the age, if not the direct product, of contemporary
international law.9 While the Zionist movement emerged in Europe in the
late nineteenth century, it was the Nazi holocaust that catapulted it to
prominence, and that established the urgency of its goals for Western audi-
ences. Many of the foundations of contemporary international law con-
cerning war—from the definition of the crime of genocide, to the legal
principles underpinning the Nuremberg Trials, to the United Nations
Charter’s limitation on the use of force to circumstances of self-defense—
were established in direct response to the events of World War II. More-
over, Israel’s legal charter, arguably at least, was UN General Assembly
Resolution 181, passed in 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine
into Jewish and Arab states, cited as such in Israel’s 1948 Declaration of
Independence.10 Israel was founded in the same year that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was passed.
It would not be unreasonable to expect that a state founded in such
a milieu would be extraordinarily conscious of the value and impact of
international law. This expectation is bolstered by the broad perception
that Israel, as a democratic nation, observes the rule of the law in its
domestic practices as well.11 It is further notable that Israel has often sub-
jected its military governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to over-
sight from the Israeli Supreme Court, which has based many of its
decisions on its understandings of international law.12
Nonetheless, Israel has a long history of what might be called ‘‘legal
entrepreneurialism,’’ that is, taking actions that are not accepted under the
prevailing norms of international law, but with the hope that they will,
ultimately, gain approval.13 This is possible because of the very structure
of international law, which is constituted not only by treaty or contractual
law but also by customary international law—that is, simply what states
actually do as a matter of practice and that other states accept as lawful.14
In other words, the determination of an act’s legal status turns on the
responses of other states, which are not always immediate, explicit, or
uniform. Hence, it is sometimes unclear whether a particular state action
that deviates from settled international law is, indeed, simply illegal, or
whether it is, instead, the leading edge of a new international legal norm.
All of this, of course, is in the context of an international legal system that,
at least as compared to domestic legal systems, lacks consistent enforce-
ment mechanisms that might otherwise bring about decisive interpreta-
tions of what is legal and what is not.
Several early examples of Israel’s international legal entrepreneurialism
include the 1960 abduction from Argentina and trial of Adolph Eichmann,
the attempt after 1967 to characterize the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as
‘‘administered’’ rather than ‘‘occupied territories,’’ and the 1981 attack on
the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq.
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Whatever one makes of the justice of Eichmann’s treatment, in legal
terms it involved striking departures from the international legal norms of
the times concerning jurisdiction (the rules concerning the propriety of
a court in hearing a particular case). As a general matter, courts decline to
hear cases that have not arisen within the territory in
which they sit, partly for practical reasons and partly
to respect the sovereignty of other states and the
greater competence of other forums to accurately
determine facts and weigh equities. Eichmann, in
contrast, was tried by the court of a state that did not
exist at the time of his alleged crimes, and which had
no territorial relationship to those alleged offenses. As Hannah Arendt
famously pointed out, the abduction and trial of Eichmann flew in the face
of then-settled principles of international jurisdiction.15 In retrospect,
Israel was one of the first states to exercise what later came to be called
‘‘universal jurisdiction,’’ whereby a court will hear cases notwithstanding
the absence of standard criteria for jurisdiction, providing that they are
sufficiently grave.16
Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 (along with the
Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula) and soon after began to establish
Israeli civilian settlements or colonies in those areas. Israel was aware that
the international law of belligerent occupation, in particular the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949, barred transfers of its civilians into the occu-
pied Palestinian territories.17 It therefore began to refer to the territories as
‘‘administered’’ rather than occupied on the theory that, as sovereignty
over the West Bank and Gaza Strip was unsettled (both had been allocated
under UN General Assembly Resolution 181 to the Arab state and had been
occupied by Jordan and Egypt respectively), no other sovereign state held
reversionary rights that needed to be protected from Israeli actions.18 Yet,
there is no such concept in international law as ‘‘administered territories.’’
This was entirely an Israeli concoction, and the characterization of the
status of the territories as ‘‘administered’’ has never been explicitly
accepted as such outside of Israel itself. On the contrary, the international
community has repeatedly affirmed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are
‘‘occupied territories’’ within the meaning of international law, perhaps
most notably and authoritatively in the International Court of Justice’s advi-
sory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s ‘‘separation wall.’’19 Nonetheless, the
‘‘missing reversioner’’ thesis, as it came to be known, served as a legal fig leaf
for Israeli colonization of the West Bank. Eventually, Israeli settlements
received the blessing of at least one influential nation, the United States, in
President George W. Bush’s April 2004 letter to the Israeli government,
acknowledging that the major blocs of Israeli colonies in the West Bank
would remain under Israeli sovereignty in any peace agreement.20
Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility in June 1981 similarly defied
then-accepted legal norms, in particular the UN Charter’s limitation on the
Israel, with its abduction of
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use of force in self-defense. Since the 1837–38 Caroline case, the principle
has been established that resort to armed self-defense is valid only when
a ‘‘necessity of self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment of deliberation.’’21 It was clear that the Iraqi
nuclear facility, which had not even neared completion, constituted no
such imminent threat to Israel. The attack, therefore, was the first explicit
exercise in the post-war period of what might be termed a ‘‘preventive
attack,’’ that is, one intended to forestall a future, merely emergent
threat.22 At the time, the Israeli action was unanimously condemned by the
UN Security Council as a violation of the UN Charter.23 Arguably, at least,
its legal status has been retroactively altered by the enunciation of the
‘‘Bush Doctrine’’ and the U.S.-led coalition 2003 invasion of Iraq (although
many nations clearly continue to oppose the legality of ‘‘preventive
war’’).24 It is also striking that in the current discourse concerning the
possibility of either a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities,
there is virtually no reference to international legality, suggesting that at
least in non-expert opinion in the West the legitimacy of preventive war
has become widely accepted.
What accounts for the willingness of Israeli political and military elites
to push against, and often transgress, the limits of international law? A
few possible factors include a tradition of illegality stemming from the
British Mandate period, when the Zionist movement went underground
and resorted to terrorist tactics against both Palestinian residents and
British authorities,25 the continuing prominence of ‘‘security concerns’’
in Israeli politics and strategic thinking,26 and finally—and perhaps most
importantly—the recurrent experience of impunity, that is, of an absence
of adverse consequences for violations of international law.
What may distinguish Israel is neither its aspirations to escape the
bounds of international law (something many states share) nor its occa-
sional transgressions against global legal norms (again, hardly unique) but
the fact that it has rarely been held to account for them, beyond condem-
nation and criticism. Contrast, for example, the experience of Iraq in its
illegal 1990 occupation of Kuwait with Israel’s occupation of Arab territo-
ries, now over forty-five years old. In the first case, the international com-
munity acted with alacrity; the UN Security Council immediately
condemned the Iraqi action, and within days imposed economic sanctions
against Iraq. When Iraq failed to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait,
a coalition of thirty-four nations was formed that forcefully ended Iraq’s
illegal occupation in less than six months. The difference in the case of
Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem), and the Gaza Strip could not be starker. There, the position
of Western states, in particular that of the United States, has ensured that
no effective action can be taken to end the Israeli occupations.
Despite Israel’s history of legal entrepreneurialism, these earlier exam-
ples all seem to have been of an ad hoc character. Driven by specific policy
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imperatives, Israeli political/military/legal elites sought legal justifications,
usually after the fact, for actions taken by their government that were
unlawful under prevailing international legal norms. But there was noth-
ing linking them, and neither were the various legal arguments made part
of a conscious or persistent campaign to transform international law. Nor
did the international community typically respond with sympathy or
understanding. Perhaps Israeli military and political elites saw the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the violations as relatively unique, thus dimin-
ishing the incentive to craft legal justifications for potential future similar
acts.
ISRAEL’S NEW CAMPAIGN AND THE ‘‘WAR ON TERROR’’
Israel’s current campaign to transform international law is distinct from
its earlier history of ad hoc legal entrepreneurialism in several respects: it
is conscious and deliberate, as indicated by public statements of Israeli
military and political leaders; it is coherent, in the sense that its proposed
doctrinal innovations are interconnected, and would consistently result in
the expansion of the permissible scope of violence for military powers; it is
institutionalized, with specialized personnel devoted to carrying it out;
and it has been sustained now for more than a decade. If one accepts that
IHL’s purpose is minimizing suffering during war, particularly to civilians,
this campaign is far more threatening a development to the integrity of
international law than Israel’s previous ‘‘one-off’’ acts of illegality. Indeed,
Israel has achieved some headway in gaining acceptability for some of its
purported legal innovations.
The campaign began with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000.
Whereas in the first intifada the Israeli military had faced Palestinian
demonstrators armed with little more than rocks and the occasional Molo-
tov cocktail, in the al-Aqsa intifada it faced, for the first time, confrontations
with Palestinians at least some of whom bore firearms and wore uniforms.
The militarization of the al-Aqsa intifada thus provided Israel with the
cover to flex its overwhelming military advantage over the Palestinians,
including the use of F-16s, attack helicopters, and other technologies typi-
cally employed only against opposing armies.
Israeli military leaders, accustomed to the Israeli Supreme Court’s over-
sight of their conduct in the occupied Palestinian territories, were aware
that the new tactics would be subject to challenge, and thus sought legal
advice. They turned to the International Law Division (ILD) of the Military
Judge Advocate General, a unit previously staffed by a small number of
lawyers that has grown both in numbers and influence over the last
decade. The unit now comprises some twenty-five lawyers, backed by an
additional thirty reservists, and has played a key role in Israel’s campaign
to re-write international law.27 The unit’s members not only provide ‘‘legal
operational advice’’ to the Israeli military, but also aid in the defense of
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Israeli military actions before the Israeli Supreme Court. Through interac-
tions with foreign military lawyers at conferences and elsewhere, ILD law-
yers have helped to export Israeli legal concepts abroad. As one observer
noted: ‘‘A feedback loop might thus be created. Policies that are success-
fully exported enjoy greater immunity from external criticism, since the
army can now claim that it simply acted in accordance with custom fol-
lowed elsewhere.’’28
The condition that has made this campaign possible, moreover, has
been the so-called ‘‘War on Terror’’ declared by the United States, and
adhered to by some other Western states, following the attacks of 11
September 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the
later U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. As former ILD head Daniel
Reisner commented on the impact of 9/11 on the U.S. attitude: ‘‘When we
started to define the confrontation with the Palestinians as an armed
confrontation, it was a dramatic switch. . . . It took four months and four
planes to change the opinion of the United States, and had it not been for
those four planes I am not sure we would have been able to develop the
thesis of the war against terrorism on the present scale.’’29
Israel hastened to present itself to the United States and to other West-
ern countries as the model for how a democracy responds—militarily,
politically, legally, and otherwise—to terrorism, and met much greater
sympathy for its claims that special adaptations to international law were
necessary to address what became known as ‘‘asymmetric warfare.’’ The
latter term, although not new in itself, has increasingly been used to
describe violent confrontations between states and ‘‘terrorist organiza-
tions.’’ Terrorists, the argument goes, systematically defy settled rules of
international law, for example, by hiding themselves within civilian popu-
lations. Requiring states to one-sidedly adhere to traditional laws of war
while the terrorists flout them is therefore unreasonable.30 In the words
of Major General Amos Yadlin, co-author with Professor Asa Kasher of
Israel’s 2003 military code of ethics:
As we sought to try and formulate how to fight terror, we
understood that we were in a different kind of war, where
the laws and ethics of conventional war did not apply. It
involves not only the asymmetry of tanks hunting against
guerrilla fighters or airplanes chasing terrorists. The main
asymmetry is in the values of the two societies involved in
the conflict—in the rules they obey. This is not a war
between the U.S. and Russia or Germany and France,
where the international rule of law is accepted by both
sides. In this case, we are fighting with a people that have
totally different values and rules of engagement.31
Yet, the War on Terror never bestowed Israel with a completely blank
check. On the contrary, emerging international norms and institut-
ions promoting accountability for international crimes—in particular the
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International Criminal Court (ICC), which began operation in 2002—have
consistently haunted Israeli officials. Describing the ICC, former ILD head
Reisner commented: ‘‘The commanders hear about this and say, ‘I might
find myself in that court; where is my lawyer?’ So it becomes natural for the
military to put lawyers in places where they have
never been before.’’32 Hence, while the War on Ter-
ror offered opportunities to modify international law
to Israel’s advantage, a sense of vulnerability to
potential prosecutions also forced Israeli generals
and other leaders to seek the cover of law for their
actions. If current law did not authorize a particular
action, it was no longer feasible simply to act—
rather, some legal justification had to be crafted.
Let us now turn to the specific legal innovations
that Israel has consistently pursued over better than
a decade.
LAW OF OCCUPATION OR OF ‘‘ARMED CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR’’?
Since 2001, Israeli military lawyers have steadily pushed to reclassify
military operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the law-
enforcement model mandated by the law of occupation to one of ‘‘armed
conflict short of war.’’ At the time, this phrase had no established meaning
in international law.33 According to Amnesty International: ‘‘Under normal
circumstances, the occupying power is bound by law enforcement stan-
dards derived from human rights law when maintaining order in occupied
territory. For example, these would require the occupying power to arrest,
rather than kill, members of armed groups suspected of carrying out
attacks, and to use the minimum amount of force necessary in countering
any security threat.’’34
While in armed conflict a military is still constrained by the laws of
war—including the duty of distinction between combatants and civilians,
and the duty to avoid attacks causing disproportionate harm to civilian
persons or objects—the standard permits far greater uses of force. Israel
initially began pressing this shift from the occupation/law enforcement
model to an ‘‘armed conflict short of war’’ model to justify its assassina-
tions of Palestinians in the occupied territories that clearly violated settled
international law. Israel had practiced what were called ‘‘targeted killings’’
in the occupied Palestinian territories since the 1970s (always denying that
it did so), but in the second intifada from late 2000 stepped up their fre-
quency, using spectacular means, such as air strikes, that rendered denial
implausible if not futile.35
The Mitchell Committee was convened by former U.S. president Bill Clin-
ton in 2001 to investigate the causes of the second intifada and to prescribe
ways to end it. Israeli lawyers went before the Mitchell Committee in April
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2001 and pleaded their case for the ‘‘armed conflict short of war,’’ citing
Palestinian uses of live fire and the scale and intensity of alleged attacks on
Israeli soldiers and civilians. The committee’s report, issued before 9/11,
criticized the blanket application of the model to the Palestinian uprising
Israel was then facing, opining that it ‘‘does not adequately describe the
variety of incidents reported since late September 2000.’’36 But it did not
repudiate the concept altogether, and thus tacitly opened the door for its
broader application. By the time of the Gaza invasion in 2008–9, neutral
observers—including Amnesty International—appeared to have tacitly
accepted Israel’s framing of the conflict in Gaza as an ‘‘armed conflict,’’ as
their criticism of Israel’s actions in terms of the duties of distinction and
the principle of proportionality betrayed. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, ‘‘if a situation arises in which fighting inside the occupied territory
reaches the requisite scale and intensity, then international humanitarian
law rules governing humane conduct in warfare apply.’’37 Thus, even while
Israel suffered strong criticism for its actions during Operation Cast Lead,
in a broader sense its strategy of recasting the nature of the conflict
appeared to have prevailed.
It should be clear that Israel has attempted to transform international
law not simply by words, but also by deeds, consciously violating then
current norms of international law, in the hope of winning later interna-
tional acceptance. As Reisner stated in 2009: ‘‘International law progresses
through violations. We invented the targeted assassination thesis and we
had to push it. At first there were protrusions that made it hard to insert
easily into the legal moulds. Eight years later it is in the center of the bou-
nds of legitimacy.’’38
REWRITING THE ‘‘DUTY OF DISTINCTION’’
In the 2008–9 Gaza fighting, Israel again tried to transform international
law through violations. For example, its military lawyers authorized the
bombing of a police cadet graduation ceremony on 27 December 2008,
instantly killing forty-eight young Palestinian men. This occurred as part
of the first wave of surprise bombings, conducted at midday. Thus, there
was no possibility these police officers could have engaged yet in any fight-
ing. Rather, it was purely their status as employees of a government run by
Hamas that marked them for death. All in all, Israeli troops killed some 248
Palestinian civilian policemen who were not engaged in fighting. Under
current international law, such deliberate killings of civilian police are
considered war crimes.39
In fact, Israel treated all employees of the Hamas-led government in the
Gaza Strip as ‘‘terrorists,’’ and thus combatants. Secretaries, court clerks,
housing officials, judges—all were, in Israeli eyes, legitimate targets for
liquidation. As Israeli military spokesman Captain Benjamin Rutland told
the BBC: ‘‘Our definition is that anyone who is involved with terrorism
76 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
within Hamas is a valid target. This ranges from the strictly military institu-
tions and includes the political institutions that provide the logistical fund-
ing and human resources for the terrorist arm.’’40
In Israel’s attack on Gaza in late 2012, similar reasoning was extended
to defend Israeli strikes on journalists working for the Hamas-operated
al-Aqsa television. In a letter to the New York Times, Israeli military spokes-
person Lieutenant Colonel Avital Liebovitch claimed:
However, when terrorist organizations exploit reporters,
either by posing as them or by hiding behind them, they
are the immediate threat to freedom of the press. Such
terrorists, who hold cameras and notebooks in their
hands, are no different from their colleagues who fire
rockets aimed at Israeli cities and cannot enjoy the rights
and protection afforded to legitimate journalists.41
Yet, Hamas is considered a ‘‘terrorist organization’’ by only a handful of
countries in the world, and their designations of it as such have purely
domestic meaning. In short, neither Israel nor other individual countries
can unilaterally brand Hamas as a ‘‘terrorist organization’’ and expect their
determinations to be binding on the entire international community.42
Indeed, there is no uniform definition of ‘‘terrorism’’ or a ‘‘terrorist orga-
nization’’ in international law, and many nations do not regard violent
resistance to foreign military occupation as ‘‘terrorism.’’ 43
WARNINGS AND ‘‘VOLUNTARY HUMAN SHIELDS’’
In Operation Cast Lead, Israeli jurists began instructing military com-
manders that any Palestinian who failed to evacuate a building or area after
warnings of an impending bombardment was a ‘‘voluntary human shield’’
and thus a participant in combat, subject to lawful attack. As one Israeli
military lawyer stated in 2009, ‘‘People who go into a house despite a warn-
ing do not have to be taken into account in terms of injury to civilians. . . .
From the legal point of view, I do not have to show consideration for
them.’’44 Warnings were generally issued by one of three methods: by tele-
phone or text message; by leaflets dropped from aircraft over Palestinian
neighborhoods; or by artillery, in a procedure dubbed ‘‘knocking on the
roof.’’ Using this technique, Israeli gunners would fire first at a building’s
corner, then, a few minutes later, to strike more structurally vulnerable
points. In 2012, ‘‘knocking on the roof’’ was further refined by the use of
low-explosive ‘‘teaser’’ bombs or missiles that initially inflicted minimal
damage, and were ostensibly designed to induce flight by Palestinian occu-
pants of targeted structures.45
In themselves, warnings to civilians to vacate a targeted structure or
area do not violate IHL and could, if timely and effective, aid a military
in respecting the obligation of distinction between combatants and
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non-combatants. In practice, however, particularly in the limited space of
the Gaza Strip, from which exit is barred by Israel itself, the voluntary
human shield policy functioned to transform warned areas into virtual
free-fire zones for Israeli troops. As one Israeli soldier commented with
respect to Israel’s ground invasion of the Gaza Strip in 2008–9: ‘‘Any move-
ment must entail gunfire. No one’s supposed to be there. . . . If you see any
signs of movement at all you shoot. This is essentially the rules of
engagement.’’46
DELIBERATE DISPROPORTIONALITY: THE ‘‘DAHIYA DOCTRINE’’
In 2008–9 and to a lesser but still measurable extent in 2012, Israel
deliberately used disproportionate force against the civilian population
of Gaza, consistent with what was named the ‘‘Dahiya Doctrine,’’ after the
quarter of Beirut that housed many Hizballah offices and enterprises and
was flattened by Israel in the 2006 war on Lebanon. As the head of Israel’s
Northern Command, General Gadi Eisenkott said in an interview pub-
lished before the Gaza invasion: ‘‘What happened in the Dahiya quarter
of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired
on. . . . We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage
and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian vil-
lages, they are military bases. . . . This is not a recommendation. This is
a plan. And it has been approved.’’47 The primary objective of the ‘‘Dahiya
Doctrine’’ is future deterrence, according to Gabi Sabroni, of Tel Aviv
University’s Institute for National Security Studies: ‘‘Such a response aims
at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an extent that will
demand long and expensive reconstruction processes.’’48 As the Gold-
stone Report on Operation Cast Lead further recognized: ‘‘The Mission
concludes from a review of the facts on the ground that it witnessed for
itself that what was prescribed as the best strategy appears to have been
precisely what was put into practice.’’49 The explicit purpose of this
doctrine, of course, was to put pressure on the civilian population to
repudiate Hamas. That, of course, is a political, not military purpose, and
is therefore barred by settled international law, which requires that harm
to civilians and to civilian objects must be proportional to the military
advantage gained by employing the particular tactic or striking a particu-
lar target.
CONCLUSIONS
This brief overview does not afford space for a detailed critique of each
of Israel’s proposed innovations in international humanitarian law. Suffice
it to say, however, that they are unidirectional, and none would, if
accepted as law, limit or constrain violence, which are IHL’s underlying
purposes. Rather, they would legalize the extension of violence to new
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spaces and against new persons. This, of course, was precisely their intent:
as one Israeli military lawyer remarked about the Gaza invasion: ‘‘Our goal
was not to fetter the army, but to give it the tools to win in a lawful
manner.’’50
What is, and what is not, unique in Israel’s current campaign to trans-
form IHL to its advantage, its effort to write new law through violence? Is
this a new and possibly dangerous development? Or does it merely repre-
sent the age-old tradition that ‘‘might makes right’’? There may be some
elements in this campaign that are new and unique to the current conjunc-
ture of global legal and political developments, and others, perhaps, that
are not.
Certainly Israel is not the only state that is a legal entrepreneur. We have
already referred to the Bush Doctrine of preventive war articulated after
the fact to justify the Iraq invasion of 2003 by the United States and a small
coalition of other countries. In a similar vein, during the lead up to the
Iraq invasion, former British prime minister Tony Blair was asked in
a BBC interview whether he would pledge to seek explicit UN Security
Council authorization for the use of force. He replied that he would so
pledge except in the event of ‘‘an unreasonable veto’’ by one of the five
permanent Security Council members. In fact no new Security Council
resolution was sought, so no veto—reasonable or unreasonable—could
have been cast. But it must be pointed out that the notion of an ‘‘unrea-
sonable veto’’ is totally novel, and has no grounding in current interna-
tional law.51
It is also notable that the Obama administration has not only continued
but expanded the program of extrajudicial assassinations via unmanned
aerial drones begun under the Bush administration (with the killings of
suspected al-Qa‘ida operatives in Yemen in 2004), and that its purportedly
liberal State Department legal advisor, Harold Koh, has asserted the legal-
ity of these killings under international law.52 It is now publicly acknowl-
edged that President Obama, trained at Harvard Law School and once
a professor of constitutional law, directly approves targeting decisions by
his government.53
It may not be coincidental that the nations currently at the forefront of
legal entrepreneurialism in respect of IHL—Israel, the United Kingdom,
the United States—are all formal democracies. While this may seem coun-
terintuitive, it may be the very concern of democracies to legitimate their
actions in legal terms that impels them to seek changes in law to conform
to new policy imperatives. Respect for the rule of law is a fundament in the
self-representation of modern democratic societies, which see ‘‘a govern-
ment of laws, not of men,’’ according to the second U.S. president John
Adams, as a necessary bulwark against arbitrary intrusions against the
rights of citizens by the state. As Laleh Khalili has observed of the similari-
ties between U.S. and Israeli practices: ‘‘The two powers converge on their
use of overwhelming force alongside a discourse of legality. In both cases,
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the law has been innovatively interpreted and deployed to allow a fairly
unfettered freedom of action for the military.’’54 If, indeed, democratic
nations prize conformity with law more highly than non-democratic
nations, then they may have greater incentive to seek legislative changes
to extant law when pursuing novel policies that are viewed as vital to
security or other basic national interests. For this reason, democracies,
ironically, may be more challenging to the international legal order than
states that have less regard for law. Whether the challenge is positive or
negative turns on the specific innovations that are being sought.
Moreover, democracies that are waging wars may be prone to particular
kinds of international legal violations due to the challenges they face in
maintaining political support for military actions from domestic constitu-
encies. This consideration places a premium on speed, that is, on accom-
plishing military objectives before domestic political opposition to war can
mobilize, as well as on tactics and technologies—such as air power and
drones—that minimize casualties among one’s own soldiers.55 These
imperatives may be particularly acute in states with armies of conscripts,
particularly if the conscripts come not only from less privileged classes or
segments of societies.
Thus, Israel, a country with an army of conscripts, pounded the Gaza
Strip for more than a week with aerial bombings in late 2008 and early
2009, and then deployed massive force in the subsequent ground invasion.
This was, apparently, a direct reaction to Israel’s experience in attacking
Lebanon in 2006. That campaign had lasted sixty-six days and killed more
than a hundred Israeli soldiers, which evoked considerable domestic
opposition before the war’s end. It is further notable that Israel’s attack
on Gaza in 2012 was purely via artillery and air; no ground invasion was
launched at all.
Of course, these tactics and technologies—despite the increasing
sophistication of targeting mechanisms and the development of purport-
edly ‘‘smart’’ weaponry—tend to shift risks from one’s own military to the
other side, including the other side’s civilian population. Smart weaponry
is less smart than advertised, and tends to lead to so-called ‘‘collateral dam-
age,’’ and thus potentially to violations of the legal duty to distinguish
between combatants and non-combatants.56
What is also evident, however, is that Israel’s effective capacity to write
law through violence is a function of power. Israel is, after all, among the
top ten, and perhaps even top five, military powers in the world, posses-
sing an estimated 100–200 nuclear weapons. At least as important, how-
ever, is the diplomatic cover that is provided to Israel by the United States,
exemplified most visibly in the forty-four exercises of the U.S.’s veto power
in the UN Security Council on Israel’s behalf—more than all of the other
U.S. vetoes since the birth of the United Nations in 1945. Releases of dip-
lomatic documents through Wikileaks have revealed the behind-the-scenes
role that U.S. envoy Susan Rice has played in efforts to thwart the progress
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of the Goldstone Report and other UN studies of Israel’s Operation Cast
Lead, a role she reprised, in the event unsuccessfully, regarding the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization’s effort to upgrade Palestine’s UN status in
both 2011 and 2012.
In fact, if Israel is a serial legal entrepreneur, it would not be misleading
to suggest that since 2001 it has engaged with the United States in a joint
venture, in which the violent actions of each pave the way for the violent
actions of the other. While neither country has gained wide acceptance of,
for example, the lawfulness of preventive war or of targeted killings, the
fact that another powerful state has set a precedent normalizes that action,
and endows it with an aura of acceptability, if not outright legality, that it
would otherwise lack.
There is a burgeoning movement within international civil society to
boycott Israel to end its impunity from international law. The movement
has arisen in response to a call issued in 2005 by approximately 170 Pales-
tinian civil society organizations, representing all three major segments of
the Palestinian people (those living as citizens of Israel, those in exile, and
those living under military occupation). The call, issued on the first
anniversary of the International Court of Justice opinion that held Israel’s
separation wall to be illegal, requested international support for a compre-
hensive boycott of Israel to force it to comply with international law. The
call has been supported by trade unions in South Africa, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and by churches, artists, and other prominent indivi-
duals in a variety of countries.
Interestingly, this movement has resorted to the kinds of sanctions—
ostracism and withdrawal of reciprocity—that anthropologists such as Mal-
inowski found were typical of acephalous (‘‘headless’’) societies, which
lack distinct, formal, political, and judicial institutions).57 It remains to be
seen whether the international community, in some senses analogous to
an acephalous society, succeeds in reigning in Israel’s legislative initiatives
in the field of IHL via a boycott.
There is at least some evidence that Israel’s run of impunity is coming to
a close. An indication of this was present in Israel’s cooperation with a UN
investigation into the legality of its attack on the Gaza ‘‘freedom flotilla’’ in
May 2010—whereas, for a decade or so, Israel’s policy had been to reject
cooperation with UN investigations of its actions. Moreover, the PLO, hav-
ing secured non-member state status for Palestine, may be on the verge of
acceding to the ICC statute, raising the prospect of possible international
criminal prosecutions for war crimes or crimes against humanity that have
been committed on Palestinian soil. On the other hand, in January 2013,
Israel became the first country to decline to participate in the Universal
Review Process of the UN Human Rights Council, seemingly reviving its
policy of non-cooperation with international investigations. We cannot
know, therefore, whether we are at the end, or merely the middle, of a pro-
longed encounter with violence’s law.
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